assess all these elements in the same relatively brief period. lured by digital's superior quality and the potential revenues from selling freed spectrum space, governments and regulators around the world are deciding how to accommodate the shift from analogue to digital broadcasting, taking into account the unique possibilities of this new technology and subsequent regulatory challenges for each nation and/or region.
Many of the traditional Canadian broadcasting challenges, such as vast geography, two official languages, a culturally diverse citizenry, and the role of public broadcasting, are once again factors in the current digital transition. Digital television offers a very large window into the policy process, involving a profound and current structural change in Canadian broadcasting. For Canada, this shift exemplifies many of the greater changes in policy since the 1991 broadcasting Act: a faith in market mechanisms, light-touch regulation, co-regulatory approaches, and the powerful influence of new technologies. This significant shift also provides opportunity for a fundamental re-assessment of the public interest objectives of the Canadian broadcasting system. A primary rationale for government involvement in broadcasting has traditionally been that the radio spectrum is a finite public resource and, as such, the public has a right to demand compensation for its use by private interests. Digital transmission uses considerably less spectrum space than analogue broadcasts, thus the digital transition promises an extensive realignment of the uses of the electromagnetic spectrum, an invisible yet highly valuable resource that belongs to all Canadians.
The legal position of the electromagnetic spectrum is emphatically in the public realm. The 1991 broadcasting Act states:
Policy section 3 (b) the Canadian broadcasting system, operating primarily in the English and French languages and comprising public, private and community elements, makes use of radio frequencies that are public property. (Canada, 1991) Industry Canada is equally clear. The introductory sentence of the 2001 Framework for Spectrum Auctions in Canada establishes the fundamental principle: "The radio frequency spectrum is a natural public resource" (Industry Canada, 2001) .
This document sets the ground rules for the sale via auction of valuable spectrum space freed by digitalization, usually to wireless telephone providers. This increasingly common practice is commonly known as the digital dividend, which drives countries to switch from their established analogue models, despite the associated inconveniences and expense. Around the world, governments have been irresistibly drawn to the financial windfall of selling excess spectrum.
As the recent spectrum auctions in Canada and the United States have demonstrated, the public spectrum space given to broadcasters is an increasingly valuable commodity. The 2008 spectrum auction in Canada raised over $4 billion for the Canadian government-far more than the projected total. Despite digital media's requirement of less spectrum capacity, these auctions have had the ironic effect of making spectrum space even more valuable than during the analogue era. The traditional spectrum allotment for broadcasters is in far greater demand; therefore, it is appropriate that the public obligations of broadcasters be re-assessed. what can the public expect in return for free use of our increasingly valuable spectrum? The switch to digital television transmission offers a rare occasion to strengthen both commercial interests and wider concerns regarding the public good. As American communication scholar Philip Napoli observes, " [D] igital television's potential contribution to the public interest provides the most compelling rationale for moving forward with the transition" (Napoli, 2003, p. 155) .
As this article will demonstrate, the Canadian digital television transition has witnessed an abdication of this key public interest element in broadcasting policy in the name of market-based efficiency-a faith in industrial initiative that has, in the end, proven incapable of the task at hand. Despite Canada's historic position of a pronounced government presence in broadcasting policy via cultural tools such as public broadcasting, domestic funding models, and Canadian content requirements, a comparative analysis in transition models and the policy process between the United States and Canada reveals a far more active American critical engagement with public interest elements during this period of significant technological innovation. This policy involvement has produced tangible results for the American public not yet on the radar in the Canadian transition.
Despite the importance of the digital transition, and Canada's tradition of critical political economy in media, there is a paucity of academic work in this area. 1 It seems a small academic industry has grown around aspects of Internet governance, and digital copyright policy has been the site of enormous popular involvement in recent years, but the digital television transition remains by and large ignored by Canadian critical communication scholars. The digital television transition in Canada has been an industry-led project, effectively free from public or academic scrutiny. This is unfortunate, for television broadcasting remains the dominant medium for the majority of Canadians. 2 Although newer media have significantly altered Canadian communication, the traditional mass media remain central to the experience of most Canadians.
The digital transition provides opportunity for a relevant and timely comparative analysis with the U.S. broadcasting system-the system, along with that of the U.K., against which Canada's is often judged. Given the interconnectedness of the two broadcasting systems, when the United States established a clear trajectory toward a fully digital broadcasting system in 1997, there was little doubt that Canada would soon follow. Canada chose to adopt the American ATSC (Advanced Television Systems Committee) standard in 1997, and the two countries have a similar percentage of households that still rely upon over-the-air signals for television access (roughly 10% in Canada and 15% in the U.S.). Canada has decided to wait until two years after the American switch to complete its own analogue shut-off in August 2011, though the firmness of this date is certainly in question. Such a wait-and-see approach is not uncommon in Canada's broadcasting history and likely prudent given Canada's strong media connections to the United States; however, there are revealing elements of the Canadian policy approach thus far that differ from the American template.
This article explores and compares the early developments in digital television broadcasting in the United States and Canada, using an approach of institutional political economy, with an emphasis on public interest objectives: "the black box whose meaning or representation is the terrain of the struggle" (Horwitz, 1989, p. 9) . Given the centrality of the concept for this study, it is incumbent to offer some parameters for the public interest. For the past two decades, the prevailing approach to the public interest in broadcasting has been best summarized by former Federal Communications Commission (FCC) chair Mark Fowler, who expressed his position with a certain rhetorical flourish in 1982:
[The FCC] should rely on the broadcasters' ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal mechanisms of the marketplace. The public interests, then, defines [sic] the public interest. (Fowler & brenner, 1982, p. 210) This definition is ideologically aligned with the general thrust of reaganomics, and therefore of its time; however, it is far too limited in its scope. It reduces the role of the citizen to that of mere consumer and ignores the inherent public value of broadcasting. one is not engaging in a civic dialogue; one is merely shopping. Contemporary U.K. legal scholar Mike Feintuck (2004) takes exception to this view and has pushed for a broader understanding. He observes: "[A] core meaning [of public interest] could be established in the context of regulation which identifies it closely with the values of equality and citizenship within a democracy" (p. 248). A 2008 study prepared for the world bank, broadcasting, Voice, and Accountability, also cites the applicability of Feintuck's work and notes "the need to revisit and reevaluate the concept of the public interest in broadcasting to suit present circumstances and needs" (buckley, Duer, Mendel, & Ó Siochrú, 2008, p. 9) .
For the purposes of this article, the public interest in television policy involves the promotion of participatory citizenship and civic engagement. There is much at stake in this debate beyond which programs one chooses to watch. Marc raboy writes:
The idea of the public interest remains the central legitimating motor for public policy intervention in communication, not only in the U.S. but wherever liberal democracy is the order of the day … Debates over defining the public interest, therefore, are among the fundamental political struggles of our time, insofar as they shape the contours of our democracies. (raboy, 2000, p. 410) Via the examination of primary documents concerned with the digital television transition-official reports, policy announcements, statistics, and speeches from significant political and industrial figures-from Canada and the United States, this article attempts to establish whether the Canadian digital television transition thus far has upheld traditional principles of the public interest in broadcasting.
This study assumes the approach of institutional political economy, in which organizational structure plays a fundamental role in resource allocation (babe, 1995; Mosco, 1996) . In this case, the central institution in question is the Canadian radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission (CrTC), though, as will be demonstrated, much of the foundational work of the transition occurred outside the public regulator. Institutional political economy also recognizes the power dynamics inherent in the surrounding policy discourse. In the case of the Canadian transition, what has been repeatedly described as a "market-based" solution upon closer examination reveals itself to be a protection of incumbent economic interests.
Contemporary realities in the process of cultural production challenge classic liberal political economy's assumption of an idealized relationship of exchange; indeed, such an approach is always suspect in the field of communications. And while this dissertation shares much of Marxist political economy's emphasis upon justice and the production process, and recognizes that the key commodity at the end of this transition process is the audience labour as revealed by Dallas Smythe (1982) , the contemporary reality in broadcasting is more complex than the orthodox Marxist belief in the state as the protector of industrial interests. The digital television transition proves this to be by and large true; however, this outcome should not be viewed as inevitable (as demonstrated to some extent in the U.S. example). A more useful approach to the role of government in broadcasting policy comes from Sylvia Harvey (2003) , who uses the metaphor of a muddy soccer pitch involving "various forces and interests, sometimes winning, sometimes losing" (p. 196). The "pitch" of the CrTC (the dominant site of the Canadian state involvement in broadcasting) has been witness to some exhaustive matches over the years, where, at times, both the corporate sector and the Canadian citizenship have been able to claim victory. A modern political economy analysis of broadcasting systems must observe that the organizational structures and bureaucratic activity are potent forces in the production and distribution of goods and services. It is within these bureaucratic structures where the citizen, so central to the idea of the public interest, may find a voice.
The science of digital television
In the past two decades, digitalization has permeated virtually all aspects of mass communication (distribution, radio, television, and the Internet), and most western nations have set dates to switch over to a fully digital national broadcasting transmission system. There is virtually no debate as to the superior quality and spectral efficiency of the digital paradigm. 3 Some understanding of the science of digital broadcasting is required, as this shift from anlaogue technology spearheads much of the regulatory change, which is not to say it limits the range of policy options. Digitalization can be described as a system that breaks information down into a binary numerical pattern where images and sounds are encoded as "0" and "1." Vincent Mosco (2004) notes that the code of ones and zeros, "a common, universal language for electronic media" (p. 155), has great appeal for users and producers. For regulators, the general public interest benefits of digitalization include a more efficient use of spectrum space and potential public revenue from selling spectrum capacity; for consumers, digital broadcasts promise clearer reception, greater choice, and the increasing appeal of high-definition (HD) television. Not all digital is high definition (there is also standard definition), though high definition is only available in a digital form. 4 HD television may be seen as a potential saviour for traditional broadcasting and associated hardware industries, as its high bandwidth requirement makes it a poor fit for Internet broadcasting, and sales of new HD-compatible televisions have been brisk in recent years. High-definition pictures provide the "wow" factor necessary to drive consumers to embrace the new technology. Digitalization has obvious benefits for an increasingly consolidated media industry: communication networks, previously structured upon distinct analogue signals, can now potentially process digital television, telephone, Internet and radio signals all on the same network and with greater clarity. 5 Many of the key regulatory decisions involving digital television were simply not possible in an analogue environment. The diminishing regime of analogue broadcasting technology is characterized by scarcity of frequencies, distinctive industry sectors, few intermediaries, and linear programming-all of which are reflected in the regulatory structure of recent decades (Verhulst, 2002) . The National Television System Committee (NTSC) was developed 65 years ago and became the analogue television transmission standard in Canada, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other countries, mostly in the Americas. An NTSC television signal occupies a total bandwidth of 6 MHz to transmit one channel over the air to viewers (CrTC, 2006b, Appendix b1).
There was a great political push in the United States in the late 1980s to develop new advanced television technology. This was largely due to legitimate U.S. concerns of a complete Japanese takeover of the electronics industry after the Japanese demonstrated their new HD analogue system in washington in 1987. The ensuing washington-financed research race developed the ATSC (Advanced Television Systems Committee) A/53 digital television transmission standard, which was approved in 1995. 6 by digitizing the signal, the Americans made HD possible for terrestrial broadcast and effectively ended Japanese dominance in the field before it ever gained mass public recognition. The same 6 MHz of bandwidth that used to carry one analogue channel can, using the digital ATSC standard, transmit one HD program stream, two medium-definition program streams, or up to five standard-definition (SD) streams as well as some associated data. 7 The flexibility to create different combinations is a key benefit of the ATSC standard (CrTC, 2006b, Appendix b2).
Some public broadcasting stations in the United States have manipulated this new ability to multicast in digital by running simultaneous multiple SD broadcasts on their allotted spectrum space during the day (i.e., children's shows, educational programming, and political information), while converting to one HD broadcast for the evening schedule (book, 2004) . Given the increased capacity and clarity, and the implications for industrial benefits in content and hardware production, one can understand the broad appeal of the digital system.
The changing spectrum allocation requirements of digital broadcasting have strong repercussions for the fast-growing wireless communications industry. The 1996 Convergence Policy, which allowed for telecommunications carriers to be eligible for broadcasting licences, means that many telephone and television companies in Canada are one and the same (Canada, 1996) . Telecommunications carriers and Internet service providers see the commercial section of the sub-700-MHz spectrum, presently occupied by television broadcasters, as ideal for new wireless services. A wireless tower transmitting in the under-700-MHz band can cover twice the geographic area of a tower transmitting in the 1900-MHz band, where many cellphones currently operate. This frequency is superior for long-range data transmission and for rural broadband services. The VHF and UHF bands, where most current analogue television signals reside, are the "prime real estate" coveted by wireless providers for its greater range. (For a further breakdown of frequencies, see Table 1 .) Many of these more technical issues are not unique to Canada. The change to digital broadcasting is now a global movement, with some countries (the United States, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands) already successfully past their analogue shut-off (ASo) date. The experience of each country is a reflection of the nation's current broadcasting environment, and digital television transitions have been by no means uniform (see Table 2 ). Key variables in this process include market size, dominant distribution systems, availability of spectrum space, and potential government subsidies (leiva, Trinidad, & Starks, 2009 ).
The digital television transition in the United States
The digital television transition has been a concern at the highest levels of government in the United States since the mid-1990s. The 1996 Telecommunications Act (the first major overhaul to U.S. federal communications legislation since the Communications Act of 1934) was the pioneering legislative framework for the digital transition and put the industrial and political process irreversibly in motion. The Act included a new section entitled "broadcast Spectrum Flexibility" (section 336), which outlined the use of new "advanced television services" and set the stage for the spectrum auctions to follow 10 years later. This new law doubled the spectrum space allotted to most broadcasters for the duration of the digital transition but mandated that previously held analogue spectrum space eventually "be surrendered to the Commission for reallocation or reassignment (or both) pursuant to Commission regulation" (United States, 1996, 336.c It is important to help affirmatively shape the new digital television era, in concert with market forces and the technology itself, by recommending appropriate legal obligations and marketplace rules. (United States, 1998, p. 1) A key point is the desire to "affirmatively shape"-to give structure to the digital era using the policy tools of the Federal Communications Commission, not simply allowing for a marketplace solution. The authors of the report emphatically endorsed the position that "people are citizens as well as consumers" (p. 134). The report echoed a position taken in the landmark red lion broadcasting Co. v. FCC Supreme Court decision of 1969 that upheld the constitutionality of the public interest standard in American broadcasting: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount" (p. 26).
The committee urged the FCC to utilize the extra programming potential of digital television to improve the quality of political discourse in the United States, including a controversial recommendation that politicians should be allowed five minutes of free air time each night in the 30 days prior to an election (p. 56). As Philip Napoli writes, the report "represented an important starting point for a meaningful examination and reassessment of how broadcast television could better contribute to American political and cultural life" (Napoli, 2003, p. 154) .
The impact of the report resonated in washington corridors of power and did indeed spark a re-assessment of broadcasters' public contributions. The report prompted an FFC inquiry into digital broadcasters' public interest obligations (FCC, 1999) . However, the FCC has never officially responded to this Notice of Inquiry. According to Napoli, much of this public interest movement was undercut by the change to the republican administration of George w. bush and his selection of Michael Powell as chair of the FCC in 2001 (Napoli, 2003) . 8 The emphasis switched to more practical, industrial issues such as building televisions with digital receivers and reaching ASo deadlines, and less upon normative debates concerning the public interest and the digital transition.
Advocacy groups such as the benton Foundation; Public Interest, Public Airwaves Coalition; Common Cause; and Freepress maintained pressure and won some concessions. In particular, the FCC placed conditions upon digital broadcasters to provide programming for children and offer information for parents as to which programs are appropriate for young viewers (FCC, 2004) . There was nothing controversial in these measures-the paucity of quality television programming for children in America is a popular political issue dating back to the Kennedy era (see Minow, 1961) and is unlikely to find opposition in either party in Congress.
However, despite this regulatory olive branch, the outcry for public interest in American broadcasting never fully subsided and once again flared up and intensified as civil society groups continued pressure. In 2005, the benton Foundation, a public interest advocacy group funded by the Ford Foundation, published its Citizen's Guide to the Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, which observed, "[A]s new technology innovations unlock new potential, policymakers must not loose [sic] sight of the goal on the horizon-ensuring that America's media choices serve the public's growing and very real needs" (benton Foundation, 2005, p. 19) . The report listed dozens of civil society groups involved with the digital broadcasting policy struggle and urged broad public involvement.
There was also debate within the FCC itself. In response to the inaction of the regulator, the Consumer Advisory Committee of the FCC released a statement in November of 2005 chastising the lack of progress: Consumers deserve to know how broadcasters will serve their day-to-day television needs-healthy programming for children, healthy programming for our democracy, healthy programming for our communities, and as much information about the TV that comes into our living rooms as the food that comes into our kitchens. The transition to digital television offers profound opportunity to improve television broadcasters' service to the public by enhancing the diversity of viewpoints, promoting civic participation, expanding local and community programming, and increasing children's programming. (FCC, Consumer Advisory Committee, 2005) In the U.S. political debate, the digital transition issue also found surprisingly strong public interest advocates from within the republican Party. In the late 1990s, republican Senator and presidential candidate bob Dole fought, and ultimately lost, the political battle to make broadcasters pay for their use of the public spectrum (Fraser, 1999) . In 2005, another future republican presidential candidate, Senator John McCain, took up the cause of digital television and was blunt in his assessment of the transition at that point.
The transition to digital television has been a grave disappointment for American consumers and nothing short of a spectrum heist, for an indefinite period of time, by television broadcasters. (McCain, 2002) McCain also championed the advisory committee's 1998 request for free air time to candidates and lobbied for a digital transition date of 2007, not 2009 (after the original 2006 date was extended).
For McCain and other American politicians, the digital transition was seen as a matter of public safety. The issue of radio spectrum was linked to matters of national security following the release of The 9/11 Commission Report in 2004. The report noted the poor communication between emergency response units in the wake of the ter-rorist attacks and stated that the increasingly congested U.S. spectrum space was partially to blame. The 9/11 Commission explicitly recommended: "Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 397). The digital transition, according to John McCain and the 9/11 Commission, is not only a matter of home entertainment and information, but a necessary step to freeing up spectrum capacity for emergency response units. Though this is not traditionally part of the discourse surrounding the public interest in broadcasting, it is nevertheless a matter still decidedly in the public realm and not confined to the more private interests of industry.
Despite the outcry from within the washington power elite and civil society groups, many remain unsatisfied with the level of public interest objectives achieved in the U.S. digital television transition. Political action has not matched the rhetoric. In 2007, FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein noted this policy disconnect in a Congressional interview:
[I]n order to maximize the benefits to the American people, the Commission needs to determine DTV broadcasters' public interest obligations. This proceeding has been pending since 1999, and the Commission has failed to produce final rules. (Adelstein, 2007) regardless of its shortcomings, the American experience has nevertheless produced results not found north of the border. First and foremost, the United States, after a five month delay, achieved its goal of a complete analogue-shut-off in 2009. Given the size and scope of the American transition, this is an enormous accomplishment. The U.S. government played a central role in the transition, including the costly decision in 2005 to set aside nearly $1 billion dollars for a coupon program to assist Americans to purchase digital converters for older analogue television sets (U.S. 2005). In early 2009, Congress made changes to the 2005 Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act and approved an extra $20 million dollars for a public education campaign (U.S. 2009). As is discussed further in the conclusion, the 2008 FCC decision to allow public use of so-called white space, the unused spectrum space between channels designed to accommodate the frequency spillover common to the less precise analogue system, is a major victory for citizens and a stinging rebuke for established broadcasting interests. It is hard to foresee such a development in Canada, where the main focus of the transition has been about protecting established interests, not exploring new possibilities.
The digital transition in Canada
by 1997, with the American digital rollout underway, Canada faced the prospect of following suit or falling behind. while American politicians and civil society groups are still vigorously engaged in the public interest battle, in Canada such a debate has never really begun. Despite the geographic, economic, technical, and cultural similarities between the two nations, the Canadian digital television switchover has taken a decidedly different trajectory from the United States, one which belies Canada's traditional approach to the inherent publicness of broadcasting.
Simply put, Canadian digital television policy has been far more market-centred than its American counterpart. After more than a decade of this approach, it has become clear that faith placed in the forces of the media marketplace to guide the transition has been misplaced. Market leadership has proven inadequate to the task at hand. In a study prepared for the CrTC in 2006, former CbC executive and leading figure in the Canadian digital transition Michael McEwen critiqued the Canadian policy plan. He noted:
Government has, to date, shown no inclination to make any change in its policy of a market driven approach. This in the context of the mounting evidence of successful European, Asian and American transition strategies, which have specific milestones, firm ASo targets, and legislation to back the plans up. (CrTC, 2006c, p. 46) This CrTC and government disconnect from public interest objectives in the digital television transition was established early in the process. In 1995, a Canadian task force was created by the Canadian government virtually in tandem with the American advisory committee established by President Clinton, though its structure, mission, and conclusions were decidedly different. The Canadian committee did not have the same high-level launch, nor did it share the mandate to re-evaluate the role of broadcasting as an essential public good. In 1995, the Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television was charged by the Canadian government with proposing a rollout plan for digital television in Canada. The task force was chaired by Michael McEwen and consisted entirely of industry representatives. (For more on membership numbers, see Table 3 .) Its brief report (47 pages including appendices), Canadian Television in the Digital Era, filed with the Minister of Canadian Heritage and Industry Canada in october 1997, was largely technical in nature. Among the 17 recommendations was a request from the task force for a time lag so that Canadian broadcasters would be 12 to 18 months behind the American switchover-a strategy designed to benefit industry in terms of the price of new hardware and a chance to learn from the mistakes of their American colleagues. As the report (under)states, "we can reasonably expect bumps and detours along the way" (Canada, Task Force on the Implementation of Digital Television, 1997, p. 12). The period of transition between the American and Canadian ASo was not the only aspect of the plan designed to benefit the industry-based membership of the task force. while the early American report sought to "shape" the digital era "in concert with market forces," the Canadian task force made it clear that their primary concern was "the continuing financial health of [the] Canadian television broadcasting system" (1997, p. 3). Such has been the Canadian approach to the digital transition for the ensuing years-the transition has been far more about maintaining a consumer base than about exploring the public possibilities of this new technology.
on the recommendation of this task force, a group was assembled to offer further advice and monitor progress as the digital switch progressed. True to its market-centred policy, the CrTC allowed industry to largely chart its own course through the early stages of the digital transition. In its 2000 public notice "Establishment of an industry working group to examine the digital distribution of existing pay and specialty services" (CrTC, 2000) , the Commission asked industry to develop proposals to govern the migration of existing pay and specialty services from analogue to digital distribution. like the early task force and CDTV, the working group was dominated by industry interests. The Digital Migration working Group included members of the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA), the Canadian Cable Systems Alliance (CCSA-a group representing small cable companies), the Canadian Association of broadcasters (CAb), and the Specialty and Premium Television Association (SPTV, now amalgamated with the CAb). A single representative of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) was included to, in the CrTC's words, "ensure that the views of consumers were taken into account" (CrTC, 2001a) . However, according to the working group's report appendix, Andrew reddick of the PIAC attended only one of the eight working group meetings in the fall of 2000 (CrTC, 2001b) . Though the Digital Migration working Group managed to issue a report (The Distribution of Existing Analog Pay and Specialty Services on a Digital basis), differences between industrial interests plagued the group.
Despite the obvious difficulties with the approach, the CrTC called upon the Digital Migration working Group yet again in 2001 "to consider the resolution of outstanding migration issues as they pertain to the larger cable systems" (CrTC, 2001a) . The reconvening of the working group did not result in any further consensus, and the working group was adjourned indefinitely in March 2003 (CrTC, 2006a . In 2001, the CrTC issued the following position statement:
The Commission also considers that a voluntary transition model, i.e. one that would develop at a pace set by the marketplace rather than mandated, is the most appropriate approach for the Canadian broadcasting system. (CrTC, 2001c) with this one sentence, the CrTC set the Canadian broadcasting system on a very different policy course than most industrialized nations, one which placed primary emphasis upon the broadcasting industry overcoming its inherent divisions. Canada's digital televison plan reinforced established television broadcasting interests and placed great faith in market mechanisms to guide the transition.
The CrTC has emphasized the expansion of the high-definition format because it believes HD places Canada in a stronger international position in the media marketplace. This position stands in contrast to many European systems, which have placed little emphasis upon HD and much more upon multiple free over-the-air digital channels (CrTC, 2006b) . A country like Canada has an advantage for HD, for Canada's spectrum space is more abundant than regions with higher population concentrations such as the United States or Europe, and thus able to accommodate the higher spectrum demands of HD transmission. 9 From the very beginning of the digital transition, the United States has seen HD as the prime consumer benefit of over-the-air digital transmission. HD has been cited by the U.S. government, the FCC, and the industry as the "gold standard" for over-theair digital service (CrTC, 2006c, p. 39) . For Canadian programs to have a chance to gain access to, and be competitive in, the lucrative American market, programming will have to be produced in high definition. This economic fact is a far more plausible factor in the recent jump in Canadian HD production than the relatively weak regulatory position of the CrTC.
In a key government publication, the 2003 Standing Committee study on Canadian Heritage, Our Cultural Sovereignty, the Standing Committee took a surprisingly straightforward industry approach to the question of DTV. Although the committee examined the impact of the digital transition on the objectives of the broadcasting Act, including issues such as privacy, Canadian content, and access, our Cultural Sovereignty never asked the key question of how digital migration might further the goals of citizenship, as U.S. officials had explored. The only mention of the public interest in the chapter dedicated to the digital transition was in relation to the necessity of standards in digital tuners (Canada, Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 2003) . Nevertheless, the heritage committee made it clear they believed the digital transition would require stronger regulatory oversight and a wider scope of voices: recommendation 12.1: The Committee recommends that the responsible federal departments and agencies develop a comprehensive plan for the digital transition in conjunction with the broadcasting industry and related public, private and not-forprofit stakeholders. (2003, p. 442) like so much of this extensive report, no further political action was taken on the recommendation.
outside of the official political arena, Canadian civil society has also been relatively quiet on digital television. In a 2006 end-of-year piece, Globe and Mail journalist Kate Taylor boldly predicted digital television would be "the single most important cultural issue the country will face in 2006" (Taylor, 2006) . The continued silence on the issue over the next 12 months once again proved the inherent dangers of New year's prognostication. Even allowing for the differences in American and Canadian political cultures (think tanks, foundation grants, parliamentary system), the Canadian experience has been decidedly subdued.
The effects of the industry-led transition are beginning to be felt in Canada. In a 2008 speech, CrTC chair Konrad von Finckenstein warned the broadcasting Invitational Summit, "My great concern is that the industry will not be ready. There will be requests for delays, and we will have a crisis on our hands. This must not be allowed to happen" (von Finckenstein, 2008) .
It already has. The current state of the Canadian digital television transition is one of confusion. A 2009 report prepared for the CrTC by the (once again) all-industry DTV working Group stated In light of the recent public statements by both public and private broadcasters and the public regulatory proceedings scheduled during 2009, the Digital working Group has found it difficult to determine (1) which conventional television stations will be operating in 2011, and (2) where analog transmitters will not be replaced by digital transmitters (CrTC 2009c. p. 4) .
In the CrTC hearings in November of 2009, entitled "Policy proceeding on a groupbased approach to the licensing of television services and on certain issues relating to conventional television, over-the-air broadcasters," CTV, CbC and Canwest Global made it clear they will not be prepared for a full transition by August, 2011, and will require at least a two-year extension.
Conclusion
whereas the United States has addressed the issue of the public interest in digital broadcasting at the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as within the federal regulator itself, the Canadian experience has been one of obscure task forces and industry groups that few citizens are aware of, and a plan designed to protect industry interests first and foremost.
It is not supposed to be this way. Marc raboy once noted of Canadian communications policy: "[N]o major change to the system can be instituted, or even seriously contemplated, without public consultation" (raboy, 1995, p. 455 ). This has not been the case thus far in the digital television transition in Canada. Various hearings at the federal regulator are indeed open for public submissions; however, these hearings address specific elements of the digital transition, not the overall direction. The public was rarely consulted during the formative first years of the process, thus digital television in Canada has never really undergone democratic scrutiny.
This democratic disconnect follows a contemporary pattern observed by Darin The initial primary indicators for the Canadian digital television system reveal a strong pro-industry position with little appetite for the greater democratic potentials of the new technology. The prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy of open markets and light government, so prevalent in the past 20 years, has dominated the process. Given Canada's traditionally more leftist media culture that has accepted a role for the government, and stronger place of the public broadcaster within the greater broadcasting system since the 1920s, it is surprising that when it comes to the contemporary essential question of public interest obligations in digital television, the debate within the United States has been far more robust.
The U.S. government offered subsidies to ensure no citizens were excluded from the digital television transition for financial reasons. The American plan allowed for a subsidy for citizens in the form of coupons for digital tuners, set at $40 per coupon, two coupons per household if required. In total, $1.4 billion was set aside by Congress for tuner subsidy (CrTC, 2006c) . The Canadian government has continually rejected such subsidy. The CrTC has served notice that the digital transition requires a greater role for the federal government. In a 2009 speech, CrTC chair Konrad von Finckenstein called for a royal Commission to "undertake a new study of the opportunities and implications of the digital world" (von Finckenstein, 2009 ). This too has thus far been rejected by the Canadian government.
The engagement of civil society groups that accompanied the early development of digital television in the United States continues into the current obama administration. A post-transition issue concerns the public use of "white space"-the small unused portions of the spectrum in between licensed channels, which could be used for public wireless Internet, among other possibilities. In 2008, the FCC unanimously approved use of this white space in the 300-and 400-MHz range for unlicensed use, rejecting the pleas of traditional broadcasters (Ganapati, 2008) . The FCC studied the issue for six years before passing judgment that allows for public exploration of what The Economist calls "wi-Fi on Steroids" (Economist.com, 2008) . In September, 2009, a wireless company named Spectrum bridge became the first company in the world to offer wireless access over television white space in the rural town of Claudville, Virginia. Such innovative thinking on matters of the pubic interest is possible because a significant amount of the population, including elected officials, have been part of the digital debate since the 1990s. The American civil society infrastructure is already in place.
with the Canadian analogue shut-off scheduled for 2011, it seems unlikely that such public activity will surface north of the border. Given the current power dynamic in digital television policy, which places incumbent industrial interests at the forefront, it is highly doubtful that Canadian policy will pursue an option such as unregulated use of white space when powerful broadcasters are united in opposition. Under the current regime, there is no market-based incentive to examine the possibilities of white space, and plenty of entrenched market opposition to the concept. Unless the digital television policy process is opened to a variety of voices, opportunities will continue to be left unexplored in Canada. broadcasting policy in Canada is always a fine balance between the maintenance of a national industry in the face of an overwhelming American market presence and the inherent public interest obligations of such a widespread and powerful medium. The digital television transition offers a rare window to strengthen both of these central components of the system. The marketplace, charged with setting the pace of transition in 2001, has failed to deliver a clear framework and has largely excluded the public from the policymaking process. The scope of analysis of digital television's potential and the inclusivity of the Canadian broadcasting system has suffered as a result.
The public interest is always an elusive concept; however, even the relatively basic conception of the public interest as a tool of democratic equality has been decidedly undervalued in Canadian digital television's formative years.
Notes
1. This article does not address issues of digital radio, as that involves a distinctly different set of problems. For an account of the difficult digital radio transition in Canada, see o'Neill (2007) .
2. According to 2008 statistics, Canadians continue to spend roughly 26 hours per week watching television, whereas they spend about 18 hours per week listening to radio, and approximately 14 hours online in English Canada and 11 hours online in French Canada (CrTC, 2009 ).
3. It should be noted that U.K. scholar Des Freedman believes the essential question "why digital?" has rarely been asked (Freedman, 2008, p. 171 9. An exception to this rule is the more limited transmission capacity of DTH satellite.
10. Although the national public broadcaster, the CbC, was present at the meetings, its role was to look after its own interests, and it was not acting in a broader public interest capacity.
